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The Dynamics of Expectations 
A Look on Forecasting as a Sequence 
  
 
Abstract 
The paper claims forecasting is a process during which forecasts are regularly updates and 
revised. Paying attention to the dynamics of expectations provides the opportunity to study 
changes in expectations formed by professionals, and thus give insights into how their labor 
unfolds. Drawing upon data from a purposely-built database of forecasts running from Sep-
tember 2006 to September 2017, linear and logistic regression models investigate the infor-
mational and organizational grounds of forecasts revisions. It it suggests that similar fore-
casts form a consistent sequence, so that revisions mostly consist in the adjustments of ‘old’ 
forecasts with respect to newly available information. By and large, forecasting means updat-
ing former forecasts. Besides, data shows the core activity of forecasting organizations, and 
in turn their audience, matter to understand the extent to which they revise their forecasts: 
despite what forecasters claim in interviews, public institutions, among which the IMF or the 
OECD, tend to revise their forecasts on a wider scale than private banks or insurance com-
panies. Eventually, scrutinizing how forecasts revisions distribute according to the years dur-
ing which they are produced, stress that during major economic crises, such as the Great 
Recession, forecasters not only revise their former expectations downward but also upward. 
This hints at a Durkheim-inspired interpretation of economic crises as re-opening the future. 
 
Keywords: macroeconomic forecast; economic sociology; organizations; economic futures; 
expectations; forecast revision. 
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Introduction 
While neoclassical economic theories often assume certainty to be a key feature of economies, 
social sciences, along with some subfields of economics, has long emphasized the importance 
of uncertainty in the ‘real’, or ‘empirical’, economic world. Uncertainty has been scrutinized 
from at least three points of view, respectively referring to the properties of commodities, to 
individual behaviors, and to the ontology of economies. First, uncertainty arises from 
unobservable qualities of goods and products. (Akerlof 1970) famously shows that 
asymmetric information, on a theoretical level, implies releasing the hypotheses of perfect 
information and homogeneous products and, empirically, may lead to sub-optimal equilibrium 
and, eventually, to the collapse of entire markets. A sociological perspective on the same issue 
highlights uncertainty over quality requires shifting from a logic of price-based choices to a 
different one, which involves judgment (Karpik 2010). Secondly, ‘boundedly rational’ actors 
face difficulties to analyze complex situations and, as a consequence, to discern ‘optimal’ 
solutions – all the more so as the ultimate consequences of action remain unknown (Simon 
1959). Uncertainty here arises from actors’ limited computational abilities: Unable to reach 
the ‘best’ solution, economic actors pursue ‘satisficing’, rather than ‘optimizing’, solutions. 
Thirdly, uncertainty is a common property of ‘real world’ situations: The classic distinction 
between risk and uncertainty (Keynes 1921; Knight 1921) sheds light on the ontological 
differences between situations with outcomes can be associated to a defined set of 
probabilities, and those where “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937, 214) Whatever its sources 
however, uncertainty prevents from attaining the conditions of general equilibrium 
(especially, homo oeconomicus and perfect competition) and therefore makes it impossible to 
reach optimality, or efficiency (Beckert 2002). 
In a functionalist perspective, forecasting aims at providing economic actors with depictions 
of economic futures. When uncertainty prevails, actors’ decisions are necessarily anchored in 
‘fictions’, requiring actors a priori to ‘suspend disbelief’ and adopt an ‘as if’ convention. When 
the future has yet to be created and cannot be known at present (Shackle 1972), economic 
actors can base their action only on ‘fictional expectations’ – that is, “pretended 
representations of a future state of affairs” (Beckert 2013, 226). In this perspective, 
‘instruments of imagination’, among which forecasts, support fictional expectations. 
Forecasts fuel actors’ imagination – they eventually build the fictional expectations upon 
which economic action and coordination is based (Beckert 2016). 
Shifting the focus from outcomes to processes	
Most literature on macroeconomic forecasting deals with ‘errors’, through the comparison 
between forecasts and actual economic performance. Indeed, assessing such errors mostly 
relies on an ex post comparison between ‘what actually happened’ and ‘what had been 
predicted’ – a reality test that forecasters often discard as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘ineffective’ (Pilmis 
2018). Explanations of collective forecasting mistakes often focus on econometric models: in 
particular, economists advocate for new forms of macroeconometric modelling that include 
financial cycles (Borio 2014) or reduce the discrepancies between the “real” world and the  
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3 
one models create (Caballero 2010; Taleb 2007). Other hypotheses stress the importance of 
cognition and beliefs in the economic world. Behavioral economists emphasize the 
importance of ‘animal spirits’ in finance and in the economy (Akerlof and Shiller 2009) – a 
notion one could apply to forecasters as well as to ‘ordinary’ economic actors. Combining 
Durkheimian and Bourdieusian traditions, sociologists underline that the adherence to a 
dominant vision of the economic order formed the ground upon which interpretations of crises 
were built (Lebaron 2010). 
Although inspiring, these sets of explanations remain partly unsatisfactory. Approaches 
dealing with econometric models often share an optimistic, and somehow positivist, belief 
that future improved models will be robust enough to provide an accurate approximation of 
economic mechanisms. Collective forecasting ‘error’ is thus regarded as a mere technical 
issue, without reference to the dynamics within the forecasting world. It claims a continuous 
‘march towards progress’ would eventually put an end to most forecasting mistakes. Besides, 
it offers little insight into the actual process of forecasting. Whether they originate from 
economics or sociology, a major drawback of ‘cognitive’ explanations lie in their almost 
tautological nature. One may provocatively summarize it as follows: ‘Forecasters make the 
same predictions because they agree on how the economy works’, or even ‘They see the same 
things because they think the same way.’ Consensus then becomes self-explanatory, resulting 
from either socio-historical configurations of the profession of economist (Fourcade 2010), 
the interwoven theoretical, political and ideological grounds of economic thinking (Lebaron 
2000), or an unquestioned human nature that would lead to herd behavior. As Keynes’s 
‘beauty contest’ famously pointed out (Keynes 1936), herding can be a relevant strategy when 
actors face uncertainty. A game-theoretical perspective on ‘rational herds’ (Chamley 2003) 
emphasizes the importance of social learning through mutual observation, since individual 
behaviors are motivated by private information. Forecasters are no exception: consensus 
partly emerges from the observation of peers. However, in addition to reducing social 
processes to the sole exchange of information, the analysis of rational herds often leaves the 
production of information in the shade and rather focuses on how it spreads. Once again, the 
process of forecasting remains unquestioned. 
Indeed, focusing on ‘errors’ rules out whole areas of the activity of forecasting. It pays 
attention to the opus operatum but provides little information about the modus operandi. 
Shedding light on forecasting as an on-going process rather than on its outcomes departs from 
the way forecasting are usually understood. Moving backstage, sociologists emphasized the 
collective dimension of forecasting and stressed the importance of social networks in its 
making (Evans 2007) or the ‘epistemic participation’ of the object of forecasters’ inquiry, the 
economy, to the very process of forecasting (Reichmann 2013). The collective dimensions of 
forecasting have therefore been studied primarily in the case of individual forecasting 
organizations (academic research centers or central banks mostly) and of singular moments 
of production. The scholarly works implicitly assume forecasts are independent from each 
other. 
This paper advocates for a different approach to the forecasting process, which emphasizes 
forecasting sequences made of successive forecasts of a similar object. Indeed, forecasters 
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4 
issue several forecasts for a same horizon, a same country, and a same variable – usually at 
the end of each quarter. To take an extreme example, the United States Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) produced more than twenty different projections of the US GDP growth at the 
end of year 2017 – forecasts being produced twice a year (usually in January and August) up 
to ten years in advance. For the same variable, country, and horizon, the IMF produced ten 
different projections – at the end of the first and third quarters of year y-5 (here, 2012), and at 
the end of each quarter of both years y-1 (2016) and y (2017). Each new forecast revises the 
preceding one to reflect the incorporation of newly available economic information – the 
implied changes being sometimes dramatic (see Figure 1 for an illustration). 
Figure 1 
CBO Forecasts of US real GDP growth at the end of 2010 and 2017 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook  
(https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/major-recurring-reports). 
Understanding the process and nature of forecasting requires paying attention to forecasts 
revisions. From a theoretical perspective, revisions provide the opportunity to study changes 
in expectations formed by professionals, and thus give insights into how their labor unfolds. 
It allows investigating the weight of various factors, whether they are related to the properties 
of the forecasted object, to the identity of forecasters, or to the historical and institutional 
environment of forecasting. This approach differs from Nordhaus’s (1987) which, through the 
analogy with financial markets (Fama 1970), concentrates on forecasts efficiency and thus 
makes little, if any, difference between revisions and ‘errors’. It obviously conveys normative 
statements as to the process it evaluates and, because it focuses on the use of available 
information rather than on the availability of information, misses one of the key dynamics of 
forecasting. For example, the deepening of economic crises, which the successive releases 
from statistical bureaus allows tracing, prevents forecast revision at date t to be independent 
from that at date t-1 – contrary to what the efficiency hypothesis implies. A processual 
approach seemingly reduces forecasting to mere calculations. Forecasts however encapsulate  
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not only figures but also scenarios. Forecasters claim their merits and achievements should be 
judged according to the scenarios they outline rather than to the figures they end up with 
(Pilmis 2018) The present paper exposes that forecasts simultaneously hold narrative and 
numerical dimensions. Both are interdependent: Figures both express numerically and 
challenge scenarios. 
Data	and	material	
The text exposes early results from ongoing research on macroeconomic governance. It draws 
upon data from a purposely-built database of forecasts running from September 2006 to 
September 2017 (designated below as ‘Forecasts Database’). Data was first drawn from 
‘Consensus Forecasts’1, a series of monthly economic forecasts from professional forecasters. 
In order to match the quarterly pace of actual forecasting, collected data was produced at the 
end of each quarter (March, June, September and December2) – in other words, the database 
contains a sample of all ‘Consensus Forecasts’ issues over an eleven-year period (size=⅓). It 
nevertheless almost exhaustively represents all the end-of-quarter releases. Secondly, 
institutional forecasters usually grant access to their publications online, providing the 
opportunity to retrieve the IMF World Economic Outlook, the OECD Economic Outlook, the 
European Commission Economic Outlook or the CBO Budget and Economic Outlook.3 The 
‘Forecasts database’ eventually gathers more than 32,000 forecasts about two macroeconomic 
variables (GDP growth and inflation, using ‘consumer prices’ as a proxy in the latter case) 
and eight countries or group of countries (China, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, United 
Kingdom, United States, and the Eurozone). Each forecasts is further characterized by its point 
value, its date t, its (more or less distant) horizon and, when appropriate, the date and 
magnitude of its revision between t-1 and t. 
This paper more specifically relies on a subset of the ‘Forecasts database’. In order to keep a 
balanced panel, analyses exclude forecasts about China and Greece, as well as to those whose 
horizon exceeds 24 months4. Furthermore, forecast organizations are distinguished according 
to their main activity: 
- Public institutions gather institutional forecasters, that is organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the European Commission (EC), and the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO). They produce figures and scenarios about an often 
large number of countries, which all forecasters closely scrutinize. 
- Major banks are multinational banks whose subsidiaries or national offices pro-
duce macroeconomic forecasts for various countries. Such banks are Bank of 
                                                 
1 Consensus Forecasts™ are publications from Consensus Economics™, a London-based organization estab-
lished in 1989 which claims to be “the world’s leading macroeconomic survey firm” (Consensus Economics 
website, http://www.consensuseconomics.com, accessed June 25th, 2019). 
2 This rule suffered only one exception: “Consensus Forecasts” for December 2011 were missing and thus re-
placed by data from January 2012. 
3 Appendix A displays the sources of the database more precisely. 
4 Appendix B provides a more detailed account of the panel structure. 
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6 
America (including Merrill Lynch), Citigroup, Crédit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, 
HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, UBS and Unicredit. 
- Other banks designates the remaining organizations of the banking sector. 
- Other organizations mostly regroup insurance companies (e.g. AIG, Allianz, Axa, 
Dai-Ichi Life, etc.), business firms with a department devoted to macroeconomic 
forecasting (among others, DuPont, FedEx, Ford, General Motors, Total or 
Toyota), research centers, consulting firms, rating companies, and some public in-
stitutions. 
Are	predictions	predictable?	Forecasting	as	a	sequence	
Forecasts rely on the computation of economic information, the largest part of which is made 
available to the community of macroeconomic forecasters by data providers and statistical 
bureaus. Scheduled press releases and embargos enable a simultaneous access to recent data 
for all forecasters and economists. 
We forecast continuously: We are equipped with databases to feed Excel spreadsheets. 
Supply comes straight from databases once the GDP is out – a quarter an hour later, and 
even sometimes at the same minute. When the US figures are released, they are under em-
bargo but they are already delivered to the press and data providers and, say, the embargo 
is lifted at 8 or 8:30 NY time, hop!, all the data becomes public at once through press 
agencies and data providers, and I get them on Excel, like, five or ten minutes later… that 
depends on the data provider, sometimes it needs maybe an hour. Then, they pour out… I 
don’t know, about one country, you get 20 or 30 entries. I don’t use them all but I do get 
them that way, automatically. 
Chief economist, Insurance company, French citizen, born early 1960’s, December 2015.5 
In this regard, the world of macroeconomic forecasting displays some features of quasi-perfect 
information. Most, if not all, macroeconomic information is available and, what is more, 
devices are designed to implement symmetry between all economists and forecasters and 
ensure they all get the same information at the same time. Since forecasting often consists in 
extrapolating recent data to spot economic trends, the nature, amount and accuracy of 
information is critical to produce forecasts. Besides, forecasters sometimes compare 
forecasting to some kind of ‘art’, which would require experience-based intuition to ‘feel’ the 
coming tendencies and spot key data in the larger dataset. One may hypothesize that the 
forecasts’ point value depends on its basic properties (or its ‘nature’, e.g. the forecasted 
variable or country, as well as its year of production) as well as on the amount of information  
available. In other words, using the forementioned dataset, linear regression models accurately 
describes the relationship between forecast value at time t vt and a set of independent variable, 
including the autoregressive model 𝑣௧ ൌ  𝛼଴ ൅ 𝛼ଵ𝑣௧ିଵ ൅ 𝜀 (model 1). The test implies four 
different linear models, all with the same dependent variable (vt) and method (OLS) but with 
varying sets of independent variables. Dummies enable to include qualitative variables in the 
models, such as forecasters’activity (public institutions, major banks, other banks, or other 
                                                 
5 All excerpts are part of a larger qualitative study, made of 48 in-depth interviews. The author has conducted 
them since June 2014 (average duration: 80 minutes) with economists and forecasters from public (either national 
or international) and private (banks, insurance companies, and so on) institutions. 
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organizations), the forecasted country or variable (GDP or inflation). When continuous 
variables proved significant, using dummies also allows scrutinizing the impact of some 
particular modalities: e.g. as the comparison between Model 3 and 4 shows, it enables paying 
attention to economic conjuncture, rather than considering ‘time’ as a mere duration. 
Table 1 
Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Values 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fo
rec
ast
s Country 
Eurozone  0.036** -0.734*** -0.741*** 
France  n.s. -0.861*** -0.853*** 
Germany  0.062*** -0.581*** -0.582*** 
Japan  n.s. -1.247*** -1.241*** 
United Kingdom  0.062*** -0.186*** -0.191*** 
United States  ref ref ref 
Variable GDP  ref ref ref Inflation  0.088*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 
Distance to horizon   0.023*** -0.004*** 
Fo
rec
ast
ers
 Bank Major bank    
n.s. n.s. 
Other bank   ref ref 
Public institution   n.s. n.s. 
Other organiza-
tion  
 n.s. n.s. 
Co
nte
xt 
 
Year 
2006 
 0.005*** -0.014*** 
0.573*** 
2007 0.368*** 
2008 0.060* 
2009 -2.050*** 
2010 n.s. 
2011 0.279*** 
2012 -0.291*** 
2013 -0.245*** 
2014 n.s. 
2015 -0.299*** 
2016 -0.379*** 
2017 ref 
Previous forecast value 0.999*** 0.999***   
     
Intercept -0.073*** -9.438*** 29.594*** 1.938***
Adjusted R-squared 0.8199 0.8217 0.1286 0.3794
df 24,737 24,729 29,701 29,691
N 27,739 24,739 29,713 29,713
Source: Forecasts Database subset. 
Method: OLS. 
Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001**: Pr. < 0.01*: Pr. < 0.05 
Table 1 exhibits that simple linear regression modelling, including a limited set of independent 
variables, accurately ‘predicts’ macroeconomic forecasts. It is noticeable that the identity of 
forecasting organizations holds little, if any, crucial role: there is no significant difference 
between banks, public institutions and other organizations. In contrast, what forecasts are 
about matters. Regarding countries, it is no surprise that the modelled coefficients reflect the 
hierarchy of macroeconomic performances, since forecasts are often continuation of past 
trends into the future. Although not always in a strictly linear manner, the horizon weighs in 
forecasts value: Indeed, all other things kept equal, and the impact of conjuncture being 
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controlled for, longer-term forecasts look more optimistic than short-term. In addition, the 
forecasts are sensitive to their context of production. Here again, the outburst of the Great 
Recession (especially year 2009) is easy to spot. This supports the claim according to which 
data providers are decisive actors who disseminate the economic and statistical raw 
information necessary to produce forecasts. All organizations being granted access to the same 
information at the same time, their precise nature, singularities and peculiarities make little 
difference, all the more so as cooperation is a key feature of the social world of forecasting 
(Evans 2007; Reichmann 2013). Shared economic information lead to similar forecasts. To 
say it more provocatively, forecasters seemingly lack ‘imagination’, and forecasting appears 
data-driven. 
Yet, as mentioned above, the most noticeable result lies in the decisive role of previous values 
to understand newly-produced ones. The removal of the previous forecast in regression 
models dramatically diminishes their goodness of fit, as shown by the R² dropping from 
around 0.82 (model 2) to 0.13 (model 3). This finding stresses that forecasting shall not be 
understood as ‘one-shot’ operations, but rather as a process along which forecasts 
continuously incorporate new economic information. Forecasts extrapolate from recent 
economic trends. In turn, they widely draw upon preceding forecasts. That forecasts are 
actually self-referential is well-known in economics. “Forecasters, Nordhaus (1987, 668) 
writes, tend to have a certain consistency (stickiness?) on their views of the world, so that 
recent forecasts will go far in explaining current forecasts”. A broader explanation to this self-
referential feature argues previous forecasts encapsulate, not only forecasters’ own views 
about the future6 , but also the amount of economic information available at time t-1 – the 
persistence of some information from one period to the next then contributes to the stickiness 
of forecasts. Indeed, revising forecasts by definition implies forecasting exercises seldom start 
from scratch. The importance of ‘post-mortem’ in the world of macroeconomic forecasting – 
that is, the examination of former forecasts at the beginning of a new exercise – demonstrates 
the connection between past and present forecasts: Spotting preceding flaws is an assumed 
requirement to achieve better forecasting. In line with the near-perfect correlation between 
one forecast and the preceding one7, it suggests that similar forecasts form a consistent 
sequence, so that revisions mostly consist in the adjustments of ‘old’ forecasts with respect to 
newly available information. By and large, forecasting means updating former forecasts. 
                                                 
6 Besides, Nordhaus (1987) often regards forecasters’ views in a behavioral perspective, drawing from Kahne-
man and Tversky’s depiction of the ‘anchoring effect’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). As most works in psy-
chology-inspired behavioral economics, such under-socialized perspective cannot truly account for social phe-
nomena (Bergeron et al. 2018): forecasters’ views are not just their own personal views, they are also grounded 
in the epistemology of economics as a whole, in the econometric tools they use, in the categories according to 
which the economy is described… 
7 Autogression Model properties (adjusted R²=0.8199, coefficient close to 1 – 0.999) stress the almost perfect 
correlation between vt and vt-1. Autocorrelation coefficient for vt (all t) is 0.91. 
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What	is	updating?	The	informational	grounds	of	forecasts	revisions	
Studying updates gives insight on the practice of forecasting as well as on economic expertise 
as a whole. Indeed, interviewees sometimes relate forecast revisions to the properties of 
organizations, such as their main activity or the contours of their audience. 
- There is a major difference as to how work is done here [a major French bank] and in the 
public sector – especially the OECD but the Planning Bureau [Dutch Centraal Planbureau] 
too. People in those places are very cautious. When the figures are bad… well, next ones 
may be good. You don’t know if this is the beginning of a new trend. You keep very cau-
tious. And if you look at the forecasts from the Planning Bureau, there is little difference 
between one forecast and the other. Things are very different here because, here, it is of 
great importance to get the new trends – and yet, like the others, we missed the [2008] crisis 
in the US. […] 
- When you said “you keep very cautious”, what does it mean? When the figures are bad, 
does it mean saying that they might not be “that bad” and, likewise, when the figures are 
good, saying they might not be “that good”? Or does… 
- [Interrupting] Yes. Well, most importantly, in the case of the OECD and the Planning 
Bureau, because these institutions are carefully watched. And, when they release something 
about the US, they fear it will trigger a stock market crash. They want to avoid that. Their 
goal is not to spread panic. Things are different here because we are not a public institution 
– we don’t bear responsibility to the general public. We assume liability to our investors. 
And we are under an obligation to warn them that things may turn very bad. Well, if that’s 
our impression, we don’t want to spread panic either. But we state “the risks are high”. […] 
And our forecasts can change far more dramatically. Also, one reason for this is that our 
clients do not really look backwards. I do. I take a look at what I had forecasted three 
months earlier. But our clients don’t give a damn: they get our forecasts once every three 
months and that’s it. At the OECD, people are far more cautious when it comes to changing 
forecasts dramatically. 
Forecaster, French Bank, Dutch Citizen, born mid-1950s. 
Beyond providing research with a testable hypothesis, the interviewee highlights the role of 
revisions for forecasters’ work. As a practical category, forecast ‘revisions’ encompass a 
variety of situations, so that several proxies may capture their intensity. As numerical re-
assessments of coming economic evolutions, their measure is three-fold: 
1) They can equate to their deviation, i.e. to their arithmetic difference between the 
value v of forecast at time t and that at time t-1: ሺ𝑣௧ െ 𝑣௧ିଵሻ – called below ‘revi-
sions’ without any other specification. 
2) Another estimate relies on their squared deviation, in order to study the magnitude 
of revisions, whatever their sign: ሺ𝑣௧ െ 𝑣௧ିଵሻ² – designated below as ‘squared re-
visions’. 
3) Finally, squared relative deviation provide a same scale for all revisions and, ac-
cordingly, allows comparing them despite widely different face values: 
൫𝑣௧ െ 𝑣௧ିଵ 𝑣௧ିଵൗ ൯². However, as forecasters often anticipate unchanged macroeco-
nomic situations (meaning vt-1=0), using such an index poses difficulties. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Forecasts Revisions (Overview) 
 
 Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Deviation -0.08 0.00 0.55 -2.29 20.84 
Squared Deviation 0.30 0.04 1.38 16.52 410.49 
Source: Forecasts Database subset 
 
 
Table 3 
Forecast Revisions by Type and Magnitude 
 
Type 
Magnitude 
Negative Positive Null Total 
N % N % N % N % 
[0-0.5[ 8,449 34.15 7,454 30.13 3,552 14.36 19,455 78.64 
[0.5-1[ 2,065 8.35 1,685 6.81   3,750 15.16 
[1-max] 1,100 4.44 434 1.75   1,534 6.20 
Total 11,614 46.95 9,573 38.70 3,552 14.36 24,739 100 
Source: Forecasts Database subset 
With null revisions excluded, χ²=195.11, df=2, p<2.2e-16. 
Table 2 and 3 expose the properties of the statistical distribution of forecasts revisions and 
squared revisions. It actually shows that, whatever the measure considered, forecasts revisions 
are not normally distributed. Indeed, forecasters more often revise downward than upward 
(mean and skewness are both negative) and forecasts revisions widely concentrate around the 
mean (kurtosis is over 20 in the case of revisions, and over 400 in the case of squared revi-
sions). The distribution of squared deviations is here especially spectacular, whose median 
(0.04) almost equates the minimal value (0 per definition) – meaning half deviations belong 
to the interval [-0.2; 0.2]. However, more than one fifth of all revisions exceed 0.5 point in 
absolute value, and more than 1 in 15 exceed 1.0 point. The implementation of linear regres-
sion models provides some insights to understand the impact of forecasts properties on their 
revisions. Table 2 exposes the results of three models, which share the same dependent vari-
able (forecasts revisions, as defined earlier). Their specifications are the same as models 1-4: 
the method used is ordinary least square and the dummies intervene in the same way. Table 3 
displays the results from another series of identical linear regressions, except for the dependent 
variable –which is now squared revisions. 
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Table 4 
Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisions 
 
    Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Fo
rec
ast
s Country 
Eurozone   0.030* 
France   n.s. 
Germany   0.052*** 
Japan   n.s. 
United Kingdom   0.045*** 
United States   ref 
Distance to hori-
zon 
0 to 5 months 
 -0.008*** 
ref 
6 to 12 months -0.097*** 
13 to 18 months -0.079*** 
19 to 24 months n.s. 
Fo
rec
ast
ers
 Bank Major Bank 
  n.s. 
Other bank   ref 
Public institution   -0.071*** 
Other organiza-
tion 
  n.s. 
Co
nte
xt 
Year 
2007 
 0.005*** 
-0.044* 
2008 -0.326*** 
2009 -0.242*** 
2010 n.s. 
2011 -0.101*** 
2012 -0.131*** 
2013 -0.073*** 
2014 -0.195*** 
2015 -0.173*** 
2016 -0.156*** 
2017 ref 
Previous forecast 
value 
Q1 
 -0.039*** 
ref 
Q2 -0.166*** 
Q3 -0.272*** 
Q4 -0.455*** 
Previous forecast 
revision  0.178*** 0.217*** 0.183*** 
    
Intercept -0.069*** -0.105*** 0.314***
Adjusted R-squared 0.0329 0.0467 0.1524
df 19,659 19,656 16,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Source: Forecasts Database subset. 
Method: OLS. 
Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001**: Pr. < 0.01*: Pr. < 0.05 
Note : The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive forecasts, therefore ex-
cluding forecasts produced during Year 2006. 
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Table 5 
Linear Regression Modelling of Squared Forecast Revisions 
 
    Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Fo
rec
ast
s Country 
Eurozone   -0.131*** 
France   -0.163*** 
Germany   n.s. 
Japan   0.156*** 
United Kingdom   n.s. 
United States   ref 
Distance to hori-
zon 
0 to 5 months 
 0.021*** 
ref 
6 to 12 months 0.379*** 
13 to 18 months 0.085** 
19 to 24 months n.s. 
Fo
rec
ast
ers
 
Bank Major Bank 
  n.s. 
Other bank   ref 
Public institution   0.263*** 
Other organization   n.s. 
Co
nte
xt 
Year 
2007 
 -0.057*** 
n.s. 
2008 0.720*** 
2009 1.156*** 
2010 0.155** 
2011 0.370*** 
2012 0.129** 
2013 n.s. 
2014 n.s. 
2015 n.s. 
2016 n.s. 
2017 ref 
Previous forecast 
value 
Q1 
 -0.085*** 
ref 
Q2 n.s. 
Q3 n.s. 
Q4 0.181*** 
Squared previous 
forecast revision  0.139*** 0.101*** 0.061*** 
    
Intercept 0.284*** 115.01*** -0.150**
Adjusted R-squared 0.0205 0.0422 0.0926
df 19,659 19,656 19,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Source: Forecasts Database subset. 
Method: OLS. 
Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001**: Pr. < 0.01*: Pr. < 0.05 
Note : The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive forecasts, therefore ex-
cluding forecasts produced during Year 2006 (see Appendix A). 
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In a seemingly unsurprising manner, Tables 4 and 5 also show that the higher the value of 
preceding forecasts, the larger their downward revisions. As to the distance to horizon, dum-
mies hint at a partly non-linear effect, suggesting lower revisions on shorter- and longer-term 
than on ‘average’ term (between 6 and 18 months ahead). It also confirms the impact of mac-
roeconomic conjuncture, with both years 2008 and 2009 being characterized by increased 
downward revisions (Table 4) and increased squared revisions (Table 5). Last but not least, 
all these models also show a close positive association between (either squared or not) revi-
sions at time t and at time t-1. As mentioned earlier, one may interpret it as a (more or less) 
deliberate forecast smoothing, but it may also relate to the informational structure of forecast-
ing and the difficulties to assess economic turns, especially in times of economic crisis and 
recovery, during which actors encounter difficulties to reach diagnosis. In this perspective, 
the relationship between revisions in t and t-1 may reflect the release of further economic 
information gradually confirming what previously appeared only as a possibility: in the end, 
data corroborates what previously was mostly judgmental. 
More interestingly, Tables 4 and 5 provide little support to the aforementioned claim that 
‘public organizations’ would be especially cautious as compared to the private banking 
system. Considering either revisions or squared revisions, public institutions differ from the 
other forecasting organizations by their tendency to revise forecasts more strongly. 
Conversely, professional forecasters more easily smooth their forecasts than institutional 
forecasters. This obviously contradicts the above-quoted forecaster. On the other hand, it 
reminds of what some other forecasters state: “One forecaster told me that he smoothed his 
forecasts because a more accurate but jumpy forecast would ‘drive his customers crazy.’ 
President Carter indeed complained about the ‘inconsistency’ of his economic advisers, 
stating he was tempted to prefer the fortune teller at the Georgia State Fair. Another reader 
commented that too-quick forecast revisions would entail reversing decisions about 
investment plans too often.” (Nordhaus 1987, 673) Besides supporting this claim, such results 
raise two additional issues. It first requires explaining the discrepancies between forecasters’ 
discourses: How come professionals from a same field hold so widely contrasting views of its 
functioning? Secondly, both discourses stress the importance of audiences to understand the 
process of forecasting. It thus challenges the usually admitted idea that forecasting is solely 
data-driven, and instead suggests studying forecasts and forecasters in their broader social 
environment. 
Besides their proxy measures, descriptions of revisions as ‘events’ can take into account their 
sign (revisions are ‘negative’ or ‘positive’), their magnitude (‘more than 0.5’ or ‘1.0 point’), 
or both (see Table 3). Some of these events are frequent enough to be modelled using logistic 
regression modelling. Each model studies a specific binary dependent variable (coded 0/1): 
negative revisions (model 9), positive revisions (model 10), and revisions over 0.5 point 
(model 11). All models rely on Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and propose the same 
set of independent variables: 
- Country (6 modalities: Eurozone, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US) 
- Forecasted Variable (2 modalities: GDP and Inflation) 
- Distance to horizon (4 modalities: 0-5, 6-12, 13-18, and 19-24 months) 
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- Forecasting Organization (4 modalities: major banks, other banks, public institu-
tions, other organizations) 
- Production year (12 modalities: 2006 to 2017) 
- Forecast value in t-1 (4 modalities: quartiles by year). 
 
Table 6 
Logistic Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisions (odds ratio) 
 Model 9 
Dependent variable: Neg-
ative Revision 
Model 10 
Dependent variable: Posi-
tive Revision 
Model 11
Dependent variable: 
Abs. Revision ≥ 0.5 pt 
Fo
rec
ast
s Country 
Eurozone 0.745*** n.s. 0.531*** 
France 0.851*** 0.722*** 0.544*** 
Germany 0.599*** 0.902* 0.784*** 
Japan 0.823*** n.s. n.s. 
United Kingdom 0.670*** n.s. n.s. 
United States ref ref ref 
Variable GDP ref ref ref Inflation 0.895*** n.s. 0.689*** 
Distance to 
horizon 
0 to 5 months ref ref ref 
6 to 12 months 1.115** 1.086* 2.992*** 
13 to 18 months n.s. 0.847*** 1.276*** 
19 to 24 months n.s. 0.739** n.s. 
Fo
rec
ast
ers
 Bank Major Bank n.s. 1.149*** n.s. Other bank ref ref ref 
Public insti-
tution 1.523*** 0.778*** 2.051*** 
Other or-
ganization n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Co
nte
xt Year 
2006 1.685*** 0.560*** 0.575*** 
2007 0.619*** 1.394*** 0.606*** 
2008 1.573*** n.s. 3.945*** 
2009 n.s. 1.200** 3.367*** 
2010 0.490*** 2.021*** n.s. 
2011 0.781*** 1.791*** 2.696*** 
2012 ref ref ref 
2013 n.s. n.s. 0.601*** 
2014 1.738*** 0.639*** 0.618*** 
2015 1.541*** 0.684*** 0.664*** 
2016 1.351*** 0.720*** 0.730*** 
2017 0.563*** 1.834*** 0.264*** 
Previous 
forecast 
value 
Q1 ref ref ref 
Q2 1.815*** 0.529*** 0.668*** 
Q3 2.764*** 0.346*** 0.665*** 
Q4 5.686*** 0.169*** 1.194*** 
    
Intercept 0.272*** 2.449*** 0.214***
Pseudo R² (MacFadden/ Nagelkerke) 0.0927/ 0.1605 0.0889/ 0.1518 0.1445/ 0.2156
Confusion Matrix Accuracy 64.84% 66.70% 79.87%
df 24,712 24,712 24,712
N 24,739 24,739 24,739
Source: Forecasts Database subset. 
Method: MLE 
Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001**: Pr. < 0.01*: Pr. < 0.05 
Table 6 exposes results that are consistent with those of linear regression models of forecasts 
revisions. They do not support the hypothesis that banks would more likely overreact to new 
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information in order to warn their clients of coming downturns, while public institutions 
would be more cautious to avoid spreading panic. Indeed, public institutions are more prone 
to revise their forecasts downward (model 9) and to revise them strongly (model 11) than any 
other organization in the panel. The argument according to which major banks would commit 
to warn their client of coming economic bursts further weakens once one takes into account 
their tendency to rise their forecasts from time t-1 to time t (model 10). Distance to horizon as 
well as production year also bear salient outcomes. First, considering odds ratio, 2008 and 
2009 appear as years during which forecasts underwent massive revisions. Yet, while many 
negative revisions occur in 2008, the following year 2009 is associated to positive revisions. 
More interestingly, regression odds-ratio for years 2008 and 2009 are non significant for re-
spectively positive and negative revisions. This contrasts with all other years in the panel, for 
which a negative association (odds-ratio <1) with one particular type of revisions (either pos-
itive or negative) comes along a positive association (odds ratio >1) with the other. In plain 
words, that far more upward (respectively, downward) forecast revisions than expected occur 
in 2009 (respectively, 2008) does not mean that, the same year, fewer downward (respectively, 
upward) revisions are observed. Moments of economic crises jeopardize former conventions 
and habits, thus opening the field of possibilities: Both deep recession and dazzling recovery 
seem possible, if not likely. Secondly, once again the distance to horizon hints at a non-linear 
temporality in forecasting. Actually, the 6 to 12-month-ahead period is the most closely asso-
ciated with forecast revision, whatever its sign, as well as, by far, with stronger revisions. 
Discussion and conclusion 
These early and exploratory results shall be considered with caution. They require 
consolidation through further analyses. In particular, testing hypotheses on smaller subsets 
would provide more robust results, as it allows restraining the analysis to one country at a 
time, excluding some years (especially those in which the crisis was most acute), and therefore 
avoiding the overdetermination of statistical results by some singular socio-historical, i.e. 
cyclical, configuration. Besides, factor analyses will enable studying forecast revisions with a 
different stance, emphasizing a ‘mutatis mutandis’ rather than a ‘ceteris paribus’ perspective 
and shedding light on the congruence and correlation between variables. 
The inquiry however displays a few features of forecasters’ work. It first shows to what extent 
is forecasting data-driven. Indeed, forecasting organizations do not hold an instrumental role 
per se. The homogeneity of models and methods amongst organizations demonstrates the 
similarities of economic reasoning across the world of forecasting. Economic information is 
treated in such similar ways that little differences arise between forecasting organizations. 
Forecast revisions trace shifts in expectations and representations of the future, whether major 
or minor. Mostly are they nothing but adjustments, which marks the incorporation of newly, 
though sometimes significant, available data. Studying the kind of data leading to such 
changes is a promising lead for further research, as it may provide insights into the categories 
of thought according to which forecasters apprehend the economy. Forecasters have to choose 
what seems relevant among such a plethoric and continuous economic information, so that 
not all data can serve as input to econometric models. The analysis of selection principles and 
their possible changes across time would then provide the opportunity to understand 
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macroeconomic thinking in the making and, eventually, to hold more closely the two 
dimensions of forecasting – narratives and calculations. Altogether, the paper shows that the 
dynamics of forecasting matter for the ways in which expectations form and change. These  
dynamics arise from forecasters’ working practices, which involve the tasks of selecting, 
questioning, interpreting and incorporating newly available economic information to produce 
forecasts for a certain type of clientele or audience. In the end, expecting means revising, 
adjusting, updating former expectations. 
Paying attention to forecast revisions also emphasizes a two-fold non-linearity of economic 
forecasting. Obviously, it first reflects the non-linearity of economic evolutions, especially in 
the case of crises and downturns, by definition disruptive. The Lehman Brothers collapse and 
its aftermath led to huge forecast revisions, especially during years 2008 and 2009. Secondly, 
it has to do with the very nature of forecasting. One would expect the distance to horizon to 
be inversely related to economic information, so that most forecast revisions would happen in 
the final months, when it accumulates and grows more precise. The collected data highlights 
on the contrary that forecasts revisions are more likely to occur earlier during the sequence of 
forecasting. Everything goes as if the main features of macroeconomic forecasts were fixed 
between six and twelve months prior to the horizon, leaving just some details to set. In line 
with an informational perspective on forecasting, it raises questions as to the nature of 
economic data available at that precise moment. Altogether, these results remind that the time 
is not a continuous but a discreet variable, whether in the economy or within economics. 
A Durkheimian perspective on economic evolutions provides a theoretical frame to 
understand how fictions about the economy change. “Crises, Durkheim writes in his seminal 
study on Suicide, [are] disturbances of the collective order.” (Durkheim 2005, 206). Such 
“anomy”, as he names it, has widespread consequences. 
The [social] scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public 
conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, 
their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown between 
the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are 
immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations. 
(Durkheim 2005, 213) 
That forecast revisions, in times of crisis, go both upwards and downwards seem to confirm 
the Durkheimian intuition of a widening range of possibilities. Major crises then would 
contribute to (re-)open the future, by making possible or thinkable what was not. Fictions, i.e. 
representations of the future, change. Again, switching narratives eventually alter point 
forecasts. Yet, another, and complimentary, way to draw on such an argument instead 
considers the raising of some previous forecasts as a way to keep the future unchanged. 
Forecasters distribute and categorize a continuous time into discreet temporalities (short-, 
medium- and long-term), and assign each of them to differing explanatory models. 
Investigating forecasters’ practices shows that short-, medium- and long-term forecasting does 
not rely on the same concepts and information. The analysis of economic conditions in the 
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last few months of an on-going year makes use of economic data about the first quarter or 
semester of the same year, which have then been made public by national statistical bureaus. 
Conversely, economic conjuncture cannot take part in longer-term forecasting, which 
provides statements about economic structures – NAIRU, potential GDP, potential growth, 
and so on are here crucial notions. Revising forecasts then means re-investigating how 
economic structures translate into numbers. Provided that, in times of crisis, downward 
revisions are more closely associated to short-term forecasts and upward revisions to medium-
term forecasts, their combination brings about a same depiction of the long-term economic 
future as prior to the crisis. In this perspective, crises are only momentary. In Durkheimian 
words, medium term would then matches the “required time to regain equilibrium”. In times 
of crisis, fictions about the economic future, for the shaping of which forecasting is 
instrumental, vary widely. One fiction however remains that most forecasters share, respective 
of their theoretical anchoring in mainstream economics: More accurately, in the long run, the 
equilibrium will prevail, and the actual output will equate the potential output. In the end, 
economic theories would operate less as “instruments of imagination” fueling actors’ 
imagination (Beckert 2016, 245–68) than as constraints restraining forecasters’. 
 
  
2019/09 
 
 
18 
 
Appendix A: Forecasts Publication Date 
 Consensus Fore-casts 
CBO 
Budget and Eco-
nomic Outlook 
EC 
Economic Fore-
casts 
IMF 
World Economic 
Outlook 
OECD 
Economic Outlook 
2006 Sept./ Dec. Aug. Nov. Sept. Jun./ Dec. 
2007 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Aug. 
Feb./ May/ Sept./ 
Nov. Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Dec. 
2008 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Sept. 
Feb./ May/ Sept./ 
Nov. Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Sept./ Dec. 
2009 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Mar./ Aug. May/ Sept./ Nov. Mar./ Sept. 
Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ 
Nov. 
2010 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Aug. 
Feb./ May/ Sept./ 
Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov. 
2011 Mar./ Jun/ Sept. Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov. 
2012 Jan./ Mar./ Jun/ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Aug. May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ Nov. 
2013 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Feb. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ Nov. 
2014 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Feb./ Aug. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. Sept./ Nov. 
2015 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. 
Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ 
Nov. 
2016 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. 
Feb./ Jun./ Sept./ 
Nov. 
2017 Mar./ Jun./ Sept./ Dec. Jan./ Jun. Feb./ May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ Sept. 
Source: ‘Forecasts Database’ 
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Appendix B: Panel Overview 
Variable and Modalities N % 
   
Country 29,713 100 
Eurozone 5,538 18.6 
France 4,109 13.8 
Germany 5,570 18.7 
Japan 4,153 14.0 
United Kingdom 4,876 16.4 
United States 5,467 18.4 
   
Macroeconomic Aggregate 29,713 100 
GDP 14,988 50.4 
Inflation 14,725 49.6 
   
Distance to Horizon 29,713 100 
0 to 5 months 7,313 24.6 
6 to 12 months 10,692 36.0 
13 to 18 months 7,621 25.6 
19 to 24 months 4,.087 13.8 
   
Forecasters 29,713 100 
Major Banks 7,137 24.0 
Bank of America – Merrill Lynch 1,026 3.5 
Citigroup 910 3.1 
Crédit Suisse 530 1.8 
Goldman Sachs 1,004 3.4 
HSBC 899 3.0 
JP Morgan 726 2.4 
Morgan Stanley 654 2.2 
UBS 868 2.9 
Unicredit 520 1.8 
Other banks 8,997 30.3 
Public institutions 2,096 7.1 
Congressional Budget Office 92 0.3 
European Commission  736 2.5 
IMF 550 1.9 
OECD 718 2.4 
Other organizations 11,483 38.6 
   
Production year 29,713 100 
2006 1,342 4.5 
2007 2,647 8.9 
2008 2,643 8.9 
2009 2,514 8.5 
2010 2,506 8.4 
2011 1,896 6.4 
2012 3,107 10.5 
2013 2,658 8.9 
2014 2,684 9.0 
2015 2,779 9.4 
2016 2,792 9.4 
2017 2,145 7.2 
Source: ‘Forecasts Database’ Subset 
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